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Darin's dissertation explains why some militaries support democratization. Specifically, he explains why some militaries set parameters on electoral, legislative, or executive institutions. He argue that militaries do this when their confidence in the ability of civilians to secure their core interests under democracy is low. The military’s confidence in civilians is higher when the military and civilians share a vision of the national project, and when parties allied with the military are institutionalized and electorally strong. Darin tests this argument using mixed-methods, including archival research and elite interviews conducted in Indonesia and Paraguay, and cross-national quantitative data using an original dataset he created on military behavior during 150 different regime transitions following military-backed authoritarian rule.
Darin's other research looks at the role of authoritarian incumbent parties and their effects on various aspects of democratic development and consolidation. For example, he has papers under review on how authoritarian incumbent parties affect democratic party system development globally, as well as how these parties restrain former military officers’ political prospects.
Authoritarianism, Democracy, Political parties, Military politics, Political development, Civilian-military relations, Comparative politics, Indonesia, Paraguay, Southeast Asia, Latin America
Democratization, Authoritarianism, Civilian-military Relations, Party and Party System Institutionalization, Latin American, and Southeast Asia